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Introduction and summary
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the U.S. 
government ran a deficit of 9.9 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2009—an unprecedented level dur-
ing peacetime. Figure 1 shows the United States’ deficit 
experience since World War II. Because U.S. history 
does not provide us with a guide for how fiscal balance 
will be restored, we look at the experiences of other coun-
tries that have faced similar budget shortfalls. In our 
investigation, we restrict our attention to industrialized 
countries since 1970. We do this because of the avail-
ability and quality of data published on these countries. 
Also, the institutions and economic fabric of these coun-
tries are closest to those of the United States, so their 
experiences are more likely to be informative for our 
current situation. 
In this article, we address the following questions: 
Is there evidence of a relationship between high defi-
cits and inflation? And how was fiscal balance restored 
in industrialized countries that experienced large defi-
cits? Did governments do this primarily by restoring 
fiscal discipline, by defaulting on debt, or by devalu-
ing debt by means of high inflation? 
In the next two sections, we explain the intuition 
and then review empirical evidence concerning the 
first question. Deficits and inflation are mechanically 
linked because inflation causes higher nominal inter-
est payments and thus swells public spending. How-
ever, as we explain in box 1 (p. 85), these large interest 
payments simply cover the depreciation in the real value 
of debt and do not increase the real burden of debt. After 
appropriately accounting for these interest payments, 
we find that large deficits are not associated with higher 
inflation contemporaneously, nor are they associated 
with the emergence of higher inflation in subsequent 
years. This finding should not necessarily be interpreted 
as implying that high deficits never cause inflation; 
rather, it is likely that the countries that can afford large 
deficits have built solid reputations and institutions 
that support a sound monetary policy and the reversion 
to a stable fiscal regime. 
Having shown that inflation does not appear to be 
the universal outcome of large fiscal deficits in our main 
sample, we examine the specific experiences of three 
countries that ran among the largest public deficits on 
record while retaining low inflation: Finland and Sweden 
in the early 1990s and Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. 
In the case of Finland and Sweden, the fiscal imbalance 
was short-lived; after a large but brief rise, the level 
of public debt returned to a sustainable path, thanks 
to fiscal surpluses and healthy macroeconomic growth. 
In Japan, public deficits were much more persistent, 
partly as a result of economic stagnation. Consequently, 
public debt there has continued to increase over the 
past 20 years, and a full resolution of fiscal imbalances 
has yet to occur. 
One commonality of the Finnish, Swedish, and 
Japanese experiences is that each nation’s large defi-
cits were the consequence of a banking crisis and the 
ensuing recession—this is analogous to the current U.S. 
experience. Our analysis complements Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s (2008a, 2008b, 2009) broader and more sys-
tematic work, which specifically looks at the onsets and 
aftermaths of financial crises across the world. Reinhart 
and Rogoff pay particular attention to macroeconomic 
performance and fiscal policy; our findings confirm 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) conclusion that banking 
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crises are associated with large jumps in public indebt-
edness. In this article, our focus is on the consequenc-
es of these episodes for inflation and monetary policy. 
Theoretical background on deficits  
and inflation
To establish our framework for examining the link 
between large deficits and higher inflation, we start by 
looking at a simple version of the government budget 
constraint relating nominal government debt to govern-
ment surplus: 
1)  Bt = (1+it   ) Bt  – 1 + P t (Gt – Tt       ) – St  , 
where Bt is the nominal value of government debt in 
year t, it is the nominal rate of return on government 
debt, Pt is the price index, Gt is real government ex-
penditure (including transfers, but excluding interest 
payments on debt), Tt is real tax revenues, and St is 
seigniorage (that is, central bank profits remitted to 
the treasury).1 
Since we will concentrate on the experience of 
low-inflation countries, St will not play a significant role 
in our analysis. Nonetheless, we include it explicitly 
because it has been emphasized by much of the prior 
research on the connections between inflation and bud-
get deficits. King and Plosser (1985) discuss several 
different measures of seigniorage and show their sim-
ilarities and differences in the case of the United States. 
The measure we adopt here starts from a simple version 
of the central bank’s balance sheet: On 
the liability side is the monetary base, 
made up of cash and bank reserves;2 and 
on the asset side are bonds, paying the 
nominal interest rate it. If no interest is 
paid on bank reserves, the central bank’s 
profits are then given by St = it  Mt  , where 
Mt is the monetary base. 
Equation 1 describes the evolution 
of public debt from one year to the next 
in nominal terms. Growth in debt need 
not lead to fiscal imbalances if it is purely 
driven by inflation or if it is matched by 
growth in the real economy that supports 
debt repayments. We thus rescale the 





































where Yt is real GDP, πt = Pt  /Pt   – 1 – 1 is inflation, and 
gt = Yt  /Yt  – 1  – 1 is the real growth rate of the economy. 
We make explicit the link between nominal inter-
est rates and inflation by writing 







e π π ≈
Equation 3 states that the nominal interest rate is  
approximately the sum of the real rate of return that 
savers expect to obtain from bonds ( ) rt
e  and their ex-
pectations about inflation.3 We substitute equation 3 




















































According to equation 4, the following five fac-
tors would shrink the debt/GDP ratio (or increase it  
if reversed). 
n  High primary surplus relative to GDP:4 Like any 
other debtor in the economy, the government can 
reduce its debt by spending less than its revenues. 
n  Increased seigniorage: When expected and realized 
inflation coincide ( ), π π t
e
t =  high inflation increases 
seigniorage and reduces debt. This source of funds 85 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Adjusting deficits to distinguish between nominal and real interest payments
To understand the importance of adjusting the deficit 
measure, we start with equation 1 (p. 84). In that 
equation, net lending is – (Bt – Bt–1). As the equation 
shows, nominal interest payments by the government 
(it  Bt –1) contribute to the deficit, since the government’s 
balance sheet counts them as expenses. However,  
the balance sheet does not take into account that in the 
presence of inflation, the real value of nominal debt is  
reduced. In nominal terms, investors lent Bt –1 to the 
government in period t – 1 and receive (1+it)Bt –1 in 
period t. However, in real terms, the resources lent by the
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where the last approximation is accurate when infla-
tion is small. Equation B1 suggests that the true inter-
est cost to the government is only approximately it – πt. 
Accordingly, from now on we correct the deficit  
according to the following definition: 
B2) Corrected deficitt = Bt – (1 + πt) Bt  – 1. 
Equation B2 would be the precise correction if all 
government assets and liabilities were nominal and 
all debt lasted one period. In practice, the precise 
correction should take into account the following 
complications. 
n	 Governments issue long-term, as well as short-
term debt. The real value of long-term debt fluc-
tuates not just because of inflation, but also be-
cause of changes in future interest rates. The  
future rate may fluctuate both because expecta-
tions about future inflation may change and be-
cause real interest rates may vary. 
n	 Some governments issue debt indexed to inflation, 
or some issue debt denominated in a foreign cur-
rency. In this case, the real value of debt will be 
preserved even if interest payments do not track 
domestic inflation, and a correction based on 
domestic inflation would be inappropriate. 
n	 An important distinction arises between gross 
and net government liabilities. One particularly 
stark example is Norway, which issues some 
government debt and thus has some nominal  
liabilities that are subject to erosion; at the same 
time, its Government Pension Fund uses oil reve-
nues to purchase a very large amount of assets. 
When government assets are stakes in real com-
panies (or are invested abroad), correcting for 
domestic inflation should be done only on the 
liability side, since the real value of a company 
will not be affected by inflation. However, in 
some cases, large nominal assets may also be 
relevant. In Japan, a large fraction of govern-
ment liabilities are held by other government 
entities, such as public financial institutions  
and social security funds. 
In this article, we ignore the first two factors. 
For our main sample, based on Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, this does not constitute a large problem, 
since most borrowing undertaken by these countries 
is nominal. The larger sample from International 
Monetary Fund statistics does include countries 
whose borrowing is primarily indexed to prices or 
foreign exchange rates. As was the case for Catão 
and Terrones (2005), a deficit correction is impossi-
ble in the larger sample because we lack data on the 
stock of government liabilities (Bt – 1 in equations B1 
and B2). Hall and Sargent (1997, 2010) use detailed 
information about individual government securities 
to compute the value of government debt at each 
point in time in the United States since World War II. 
Their exercise provides a much more accurate  
account of the factors that drove the evolution of 
U.S. government debt. Unfortunately, a similar exer-
cise is not available for other countries. Over short 
horizons, the Hall–Sargent measure of deficits is much 
more volatile than the one adopted here, and is mainly 
driven by changes in interest rates. At longer horizons, 
however, the two measures are more similar. 
We deal with the third factor by conservatively 
assuming that government assets are nominal, and 
we thus compute the inflation correction based on 
net government financial liabilities. Figures based  
on correcting deficits based on gross liabilities would 
strengthen our conclusion—that deficits are not as-
sociated with higher inflation in our OECD sample; 
in fact, the opposite relationship would emerge—
that is, countries with higher deficits (after the cor-
rection) would tend to have lower inflation. 86 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
has been important for many developing countries 
that have experienced high inflation. As an example, 
Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2009) report that 
seigniorage frequently raised revenues of more 
than 5 percent of GDP for Argentina and Brazil 
during their high-inflation years, with occasional 
higher spikes. In the case of low-inflation economies, 
however, this number is always very small. In the 
case of the United States, seigniorage revenues 
averaged 0.36 percent of GDP between 1959 and 
2009, and were never more than 0.8 percent, even 
in the 1970s, when inflation was relatively high.5 
Any link between deficits and inflation that con-
cerns us will thus come from a different channel. 
n	High unexpected inflation: When unexpected in-
flation comes, it reduces the real value of previously 
issued debt. Unexpected inflation acts thus as a 
hidden default on debtors’ obligations. A govern-
ment dealing with larger deficits faces a greater 
incentive to lean on the central bank and encour-
age higher inflation to alleviate its fiscal imbalance. 
This is a well-known source of the time inconsis-
tency of monetary policy:6 Once the private sec-
tor’s expectations are locked into the nominal in-
terest rate, any movement in inflation becomes 
“unexpected,” and the temptation to “inflate debt 
away” emerges. In our simple version of the budget 
constraint, inflation expectations are locked in for 
a single year, since all debt matures at the end of 
the year. However, in reality government debt has 
a longer average maturity; for example, the current 
average maturity of U.S. debt is 54 months.7 This 
gives extra time for inflation to act, and correspond-
ingly increases the temptation for a government 
to inflate its debt away.8 
n	A smaller real interest rate: The debt/GDP ratio 
decreases (or increases more slowly) if lenders  
require a smaller real interest rate. To the extent 
that government debt crowds out private invest-
ment, we would expect higher debt/GDP ratios  
to put upward pressure on the real interest rate. 
However, large deficits may be associated with other 
circumstances that lower the real interest rate paid 
by the government. For instance, the recent finan-
cial market turmoil has led to a “flight to quality” 
that has greatly reduced yields on government bonds 
while sharply increasing rates for less creditworthy 
borrowers. The government may also be tempted 
to use capital taxes, capital controls, or other di-
rect measures to divert credit away from private 
markets and toward its own needs. A prominent 
recent example was the Argentinian government’s 
takeover of private pension plans.9 For the United 
States after World War II, Berndt, Lustig, and 
Yeltekin (2010) find that real interest rates decrease 
after a negative fiscal shock, hedging 7.8 percent 
of the risk stemming from these shocks. 
n	High real economic growth: Growth spreads the 
burden of debt onto a bigger productive base.  
In most economic models of a closed economy, 
high growth is associated with high real interest 
rates, and no direct fiscal benefit would ensue  
from such growth. However, empirically, the link 
between growth and interest rates is not as strict, 
and this is particularly true in an open economy, 
where interest rates are also affected by the saving 
decisions of foreigners.10 
Equation 4 does not explicitly allow for a reduction 
in debt through default; this is not an important omis-
sion, since we are mainly interested in the experience 
of countries that experienced high deficits and low  
inflation (none of them having defaulted on their 
debt). Nonetheless, an implicit default is allowed by 
equation 4, in the form of a capital levy on holders  
of government debt that would be counted among  
the tax revenues. 
The empirical link between deficits  
and inflation
In the previous section, we noted that engineering 
higher inflation is a temptation for governments facing 
fiscal imbalances, since it devalues previously issued 
debt. In this section, we explore the relationship be-
tween deficits and inflation in the data. 
A very large literature on this topic already exists. 
Sargent (1982, 1983) finds evidence of a strong link 
between deficits and inflation in several European coun-
tries in the aftermath of World War I. Furthermore, 
inflation was brought under control in these countries 
only when fiscal reforms placed government finances 
on sound footing. While there is widespread consensus 
that hyperinflations are caused by fiscal imbalances,11 
at more-moderate inflations the evidence of a link is 
murkier. The case of France in the 1920s analyzed by 
Sargent (1983) is not as typical of the post-World War II 
experience. 
Rather than looking at inflation, several researchers 
have studied the link between money creation and defi-
cits. For the United States after World War II, Hamburger 
and Zwick (1981) find that monetary growth is influ-
enced by deficits, but only in specific episodes. Likewise, 
King and Plosser (1985) show that whether deficits 
can predict monetary growth depends on what other 
variables are used in the forecasting exercise; they 87 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
conclude that there is no evidence of a link between 
monetary growth and deficits in the United States. 
King and Plosser also extend the analysis to 11 other 
countries and again find no evidence of a link between 
deficits and seigniorage. 
Catão and Terrones (2005) expand the analysis of 
inflation and deficits to a very large number of coun-
tries by relying on the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) International Financial Statistics. They also  
allow for a richer dynamic specification of the infla-
tion process and test whether there is a long-run rela-
tionship between deficits and inflation. They do find 
such a link: Specifically, when deficits are rescaled  
by GDP, a 1 percent increase in the deficit/GDP mea-
sure is associated with about 5 percent extra inflation.12 
However, even in their paper, no such evidence is 
found among advanced economies with low inflation. 
Furthermore, data limitations do not allow them to 
correct deficits to properly account for real interest 
payments on debt. 
In this article, we take the view that an economy 
with inflation is like a person with a fever: The fever 
tells you something is wrong, but it can have many 
causes.13 The question we address is whether high 
deficits are one of the conditions that is invariably  
associated with inflation. To answer this question,  
we work mostly in reverse, looking at low-inflation 
countries and checking whether their fiscal house is 
always in order. 
In figure 2, panel A, we look at the relationship 
between government surplus as a fraction of GDP 
(more formally, net lending as a fraction of GDP) and 
inflation, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), 
in our main sample. This sample consists of data for 
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), excluding Mexico, Turkey, 
and some other ex-communist countries, over the period 
1970–2008 (for details, see the appendix). The marks in 
panel A of figure 2 represent the inflation–surplus pairs 
for all the countries in each year of available data. To 
gain a better understanding of the pattern, we sort all 
observations by their inflation level and divide them 
into ten bins. Within each bin, we then compute the 
median, represented by the black line, and the 5th and 
10th percentiles, represented by the two red lines.14 While 
the median shows little, if any relationship between sur-
pluses and inflation, the two red lines suggest a nega-
tive relationship: It appears that, at high deficit levels 
(very negative surpluses), further increases in deficits 
are associated with higher inflation. 
Figure 2, panel B shows a similar pattern for a 
broader set of countries—52 countries from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics15 (see the appendix for 
details). Panels A and B of figure 2 paint a misleading 
picture of the true economic relationship between defi-
cits and inflation. The nominal deficit measure adopt-
ed in these panels shows the change in nominal debt. 
In the presence of inflation, nominal interest payments 
may be high and swell the nominal deficit measure, 
even though the real cost of servicing the debt is not 
particularly high, as shown by equation 3. This gener-
ates a mechanical link between inflation and deficits 
that is not related to the underlying economic situa-
tion. A more accurate description of the fiscal burden 
left to repay is the change in real debt. Therefore, we 
exclude the part of the nominal interest payments that 
compensates investors for the erosion of the real value 
of debt that comes from inflation. 
From now on, we focus on our main sample, which 
uses data on OECD countries. Figure 2, panel C shows 
how the relationship changes after the surplus measure 
is corrected. Here, we observe no relationship between 
surpluses and inflation. Table 1 presents the same evi-
dence through the lens of a parametric statistical model. 
Specifically, we regress the surplus in country i and in 
year t (measured in percentage points of GDP) on CPI 
inflation (measured in percentage points): 
5)   surplusit = α + βinflationit + εit,
where εit is an error term that captures all the reasons 
why inflation and surpluses are not perfectly linked. 
As in figure 2, we are interested in capturing how the 
relationship fits at different deficit levels, paying par-
ticular attention to countries experiencing high deficits. 
We achieve this by estimating equation 5 with three 
separate quantile regressions: The 5 percent and 10 per-
cent quantiles show the relationship at very low surplus 
levels (high deficits), and the median (the 50 percent 
quantile) shows the relationship closer to more typical 
levels.16 Each regression suggests a very weak, statis-
tically insignificant, and positive relationship between 
inflation and surpluses, as shown by the positive coef-
ficients on inflation; these results confirm the picture 
emerging from the figure 2, panel C. 
So far, we have concentrated on the contempora-
neous correlation between inflation and deficits. There 
are several reasons, however, why this relationship may 
show up with a delay. First, Sargent and Wallace (1981) 
show that the timing of an inflationary response to def-
icits may depend on the details of monetary policy. 
Second, if engineering higher inflation is a response 
to the temptation to devalue nominal debt, this temp-
tation will gradually grow as deficits swell the size of 
debt. In figure 3 (p. 90), we look for evidence that large 
deficits are precursors to higher inflation in subsequent 88 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Government surplus and inflation
A. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development sample
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
B. International Monetary Fund sample
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
C. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development sample with debt-adjusted surplus
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
inflation, year-over-year percent change
inflation, year-over-year percent change
inflation, year-over-year percent change
    Median      10th percentile                5th percentile
Notes: Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. Panel C uses the debt adjustment described in box 1.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD;  
and International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department (1995, 2000, 2005, 2009).
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    TaBlE 1
Quantile regressions of government surplus 
on inflation
  Fifth   Tenth   Median
 
Inflation   0.059   0.061   0.063
  (0.091)   (0.072)   (0.039)
Constant   –7.140   –5.617   –1.496
  (0.554)   (0.461)   (0.238)
Notes: Inflation is measured by the consumer price index (CPI).  
Each column corresponds to a different quantile regression. The 
standard errors, which appear in parentheses, are not corrected  
for clustering, so the precision of the estimates are overstated.  
The cluster correction would lead them to be even less statistically  
significant. For more details, see the text.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization  
for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD.
years. Specifically, panel A of figure 3 shows the con-
nection between (corrected) surpluses and the average 
of inflation two to four years ahead, and panel B of 
figure 3 repeats the exercise for the average of infla-
tion five to seven years ahead. Again, these panels in 
figure 3 show no clear connection; if anything, very high 
deficits seem more prevalent in countries that experi-
ence low inflation in the subsequent years. As a final 
check, in figure 4 we look at the relationship between 
the stock of government net assets (as a fraction of 
GDP) and inflation. Once again, this figure shows no 
evidence of a negative relationship: Heavily indebted 
countries seem to have lower inflation.17 
Government deficits are the outcome of a supply 
of bonds by the government that is met by a demand 
from willing lenders.18 Accordingly, our results are 
consistent with two possible explanations that empha-
size the supply and the demand, respectively: 
n	Governments do not give in to the temptation to 
inflate away debt, even in times of fiscal straits 
that lead them to large deficits. 
n	Lenders are aware that different governments have 
different reactions to the temptation to inflate debt 
away or to outright default on their obligations 
through other means; each government’s reaction 
largely depends on the institutional framework of 
the country or the political inclination of the dom-
inant parties in that country. As a consequence, 
lenders are only willing to lend to (and thus permit 
large deficits in) countries during periods in which 
the government can be trusted to raise appropriate 
revenues to repay debt. In this case, the lack of a 
relationship between higher inflation and large defi-
cits reflects the fact that only the “most virtuous” 
countries (those that repay their debts on time) 
ever experience large deficits. 
We will not attempt to distinguish which is the 
correct interpretation. However, previous literature 
has provided indirect evidence in favor of the second 
hypothesis. Many researchers have emphasized the 
link between low inflation and central bank indepen-
dence from the executive branch of government;19 it 
is likely that this institutional arrangement played an 
important role for many countries that had low infla-
tion, though they were running (or had previously 
run) high deficits.20 Furthermore, Reinhart, Rogoff, 
and Savastano (2003) identify thresholds of “external 
debt intolerance” that differ across countries. A coun-
try more intolerant of debt faces macroeconomic in-
stability and market expectations of a default at levels 
that do not cause concern for a less intolerant country. 
In figure 2, panel C (p. 88), we established that 
there are several instances of countries that ran very 
large deficits and pursued low inflation at the same 
time. Figure 5 magnifies the bottom left corner of  
figure 2, panel C, and identifies these instances. Of  
the points identified here, three are due to large one-
off accounting adjustments that do not reflect the true 
deficit: This is the case of Germany and the Netherlands 
in 1995 and Japan in 1998 (although Japan’s deficit  
in 1998 remains substantial even after adjusting for 
one-off measures).21 Two countries appear repeatedly 
in the picture: Sweden in the early 1990s and Japan  
in the late 1990s and at the beginning of this century. 
Furthermore, while Finland appears only once, its 
macroeconomic and fiscal performance in the early 
1990s was similar to that of Sweden. In the next two 
sections, we discuss these particular deficit experiences 
in Finland, Sweden, and Japan in further detail. 
Finland and Sweden
In both Finland and Sweden, the 1980s were a 
decade of financial deregulation.22 The improved abil-
ity to access foreign capital markets led to a boom in 
asset prices. Figure 6, panel A (p. 92) shows the per-
formance of major stock market indexes in the two 
countries; for Sweden, the stock market appreciation 
of the late 1980s is even faster than the high-flying 
dot-com era of the late 1990s. Both countries adopted 
a fixed-exchange-rate regime in this period: Both the 
Finnish markka and the Swedish krona were pegged 
to a basket of foreign currencies.23 The interest rate 
differential with respect to Germany and other coun-
tries with a stronger tradition of price stability induced 
domestic borrowers to take loans denominated in for-
eign currencies; while this saved interest costs during 
the pegged-exchange-rate regime, it magnified the 
balance sheet difficulties when central banks were 
forced to devalue their currencies and let them float 
in the wake of the crisis. 90 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Government surplus and future inflation
A. Two to four years ahead
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
B. Five to seven years ahead
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
inflation, year-over-year percent change
inflation, year-over-year percent change
Notes: Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. This figure uses the debt adjustment described in box 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD.
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By 1990, the combination of a rise in interest rates 
throughout Europe (following the German reunification) 
and the increasing risk of a devaluation of the Finnish 
markka and the Swedish krona led to a surge in interest 
rates, first stopping and later dramatically reversing 
the asset price appreciation. This led to large losses in 
the banking sector, and eventually forced the govern-
ments of both Finland and Sweden to step in, guaran-
tee the banks’ creditors, and take over some of the most 
troubled institutions. The financial crisis was accom-
panied by a severe recession, as highlighted in figure 6, 
panel B, which measures real GDP. Figure 6, panel C 
plots government surpluses as a fraction of GDP (that  
is, net lending as a fraction of GDP) in Finland and  
Sweden.24 As seen in this panel, the large deficits doc-
umented in figure 5 were a (slightly delayed) conse-
quence of the recession. They were mostly caused by 
the need to recapitalize the banks and by the so-called  
automatic fiscal stabilizers, that is, the natural tendency 
of tax revenues to drop and unemployment and other 
welfare payments to increase during recessions. There 
was no intentional “fiscal stimulus;” rather, discretionary 
fiscal policy actually started tightening by 1993, with tax 
rate increases and the containment of public expenditure, 
    Median      10th percentile                5th percentile91 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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General government net assets and inflation
net assets, percent of gross domestic product
inflation, year-over-year percent change
Note: Inflation is measured by the consumer price index.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD.







Government surplus and inflation: High-deficit, low-inflation countries
surplus, percent of gross domestic product
Notes: Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. This figure uses the debt adjustment described in box 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD.
inflation, year-over-year percent change

















as discussed by Honkapohja et al. (2009) and Jonung, 
Schuknecht, and Tujula (2005). Figure 6, panel D dis-
plays government gross financial liabilities.25 The finan-
cial crisis and the recession saddled Finland and Sweden 
with substantial liabilities. Nonetheless, the ratio of debt 
to GDP in both countries started to decline shortly  
after the end of the recession. This decline was entire-
ly driven by solid growth rates in GDP and fiscal sur-
pluses—and not by inflation, to which we turn next, 
in figure 6, panel E. As seen in that panel, Finland and 
Sweden did experience moderate degrees of inflation, 
but this preceded the crisis, rather than followed it. 
    Median      10th percentile                5th percentile92 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Notes: Panel A plots the performance of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX) All Share Index for Finland and the Affärsvärldens 
Generalindex (AFGX) for Sweden. Panel E plots inflation as measured by the consumer price index.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD;  
and Haver Analytics.
Finland and Sweden: Macroeconomic indicators
A. Stock market indexes
index, log scale, 2005 = 100
B. Real gross domestic product
index, log scale, 2005 = 100
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C. General government surplus
percent of gross domestic product
D. General government gross financial liabilities
percent of gross domestic product
E. Inflation 
year-over-year percent change
    Finland      Sweden93 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Inflation was one of the causes of the crisis: In combi-
nation with a fixed exchange rate, it led to a loss in 
competitiveness, which was only restored after the 
currency pegs were abandoned in 1992. However, 
neither country attempted to rely on a monetary poli-
cy accommodating high inflation during or after the 
deficit years to erode the large stock of accumulated 
financial liabilities.26
Japan
As with Finland and Sweden, Japan also experi-
enced a dramatic rise in asset prices during the 1980s. 
In late 1991, the value of the land underneath the  
Emperor’s Palace in Tokyo was estimated to be worth 
about the same as the value of the land in the entire state 
of California.27 Panel A of figure 7 shows the perfor-
mance of Japan’s stock market, which peaked a little 
earlier than those of Finland and Sweden, in 1989. The 
causes of the Japanese boom and bust are more com-
plex than those of Finland and Sweden; a more complete 
discussion can be found in Kuttner and Posen (2001), 
Posen (1998), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and Hoshi 
and Kashyap (2004). An important difference is that 
Japanese assets never recovered from the crisis, and still 
remain well below their peaks registered 20 years ago. 
Panel B of figure 7 displays Japan’s real GDP, 
whose path is similar to that of Japan’s stock market. 
While Finland and Sweden experienced a quick recovery 
after the recession, Japan entered into a prolonged pe-
riod of stagnation. The extent to which Japan resorted 
to expansionary fiscal policy to overcome its weak mac-
roeconomic performance is debated. Kuttner and Posen 
(2001) and Posen (1998) argue that Japan’s fiscal def-
icits were largely a natural consequence of weak growth, 
with only small discretionary fiscal expansion; fiscal 
policy even turned contractionary in 1997, as discussed 
in some detail by Braun and Díaz-Giménez (2009). 
Whether it was a consequence of automatic stabilizers 
or a conscious choice to use fiscal policy to stimulate 
growth, panel C of figure 7 shows that Japan has run 
large public deficits since the early 1990s, particularly 
in the early 2000s.28 As a consequence of these deficits, 
Japan has accumulated a large debt position. In figure 7, 
panel D, we plot the gross financial liabilities of the 
Japanese government. Panel D of figure 7 exaggerates 
the Japanese indebtedness, since a significant fraction 
of these liabilities are held by government agencies, 
as emphasized by Broda and Weinstein (2004). Gov-
ernment net financial liabilities, as shown in figure 7, 
panel E, provide a clearer picture of the Japanese fis-
cal situation. Even by this measure, Japan has been 
accumulating a large stock of debt. Since our debt 
metric is the ratio of debt to GDP, the lack of growth 
in GDP is an important cause of this accumulation: 
Had Japan grown as much as Sweden between 1992 
and 2008, its ratio of debt to GDP would have been 
about 20 percent smaller than it is, even with no change 
in deficits.29 Unlike for Finland and Sweden, a full 
fiscal adjustment to restore stability in the debt/GDP 
ratio has not yet materialized in Japan, so it is still 
possible in principle that the large debt accumulation 
will be eventually eroded away through higher infla-
tion. Nonetheless, the experience of the past 20 years 
shows no evidence that Japan has given in to this temp-
tation; in fact, as is well known, Japan often experienced 
deflation in this period, as shown in figure 7, panel F. 
Market interest rates on Japanese government bonds 
remain low, suggesting that lenders do not yet perceive 
a significant risk of default or inflation in the future.30 
This is yet another difference from the Finnish and 
Swedish experience in the 1990s: In Finland and 
Sweden, interest rates spiked during their financial 
crisis, providing strong incentives for fiscal adjust-
ment that Japan never faced.31 
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this article shows that 
large fiscal deficits in industrialized countries did not 
coincide with higher inflation, nor did large deficits 
precede higher inflation. Facing sizable fiscal imbalances, 
central banks in these countries were nonetheless able 
to maintain an orderly monetary policy.32 A tempting 
interpretation is that these central banks stood fast be-
cause their independence allowed them to do so and 
they wanted to preserve their solid reputations; at the 
same time, central bank independence shielded govern-
ments from the temptation to force the monetization 
of debt, and led fiscal authorities to revert quickly to 
a sustainable debt path. However, a full account of the 
institutions that supported price stability in the face of 
large fiscal shocks is beyond the scope of this article. 94 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
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Notes: Panel A plots the performance of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Stock Price Index (TSE TOPIX). Panel F plots inflation as measured 
by the consumer price index.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SourceOECD;  
and Haver Analytics.
Japan: Macroeconomic indicators
A. Stock market index
index, log scale, 2005 = 100
B. Real gross domestic product
index, log scale, 2005 = 100
C. General government surplus
percent of gross domestic product
D. General government gross financial liabilities
percent of gross domestic product
E. General government net financial liabilities
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NOTES
1One simplification is that equation 1 treats government debt as if it 
had a one-year maturity. In practice, a large fraction of government 
debt has longer maturity. The deficit implications of correctly valuing 
long-term debt are studied by Hall and Sargent (1997, 2010). This 
equation also treats the government as a single entity. In practice, even 
at the U.S. federal level, the Social Security and Medicare trust funds 
keep separate accounts from the rest of the federal government. 
Moreover, states and numerous local governments have their own 
budgets. Throughout this article, we consolidate all of these budgets 
into one (whenever possible). A further simplification is that we lump 
purchases of capital together with other forms of spending in Gt 
and that we lump sales of capital together with other revenues in Tt. 
In the case of the United States, spectrum auctions (auctions to sell 
the rights to transmit signals over specific electromagnetic wave-
lengths) are the only major source of revenues from privatization 
of public capital.
2The liability side also contains the bank’s capital; however, this is 
a relatively small entry, so we abstract from it here.
3The approximation is accurate as long as inflation and interest rates 
are small.
4The primary surplus is the difference between government reve-
nues and expenditures, excluding interest payments, and is captured 
by the second term on the right-hand side of equation 4.
5For this computation, we used interest rates on one-year Treasury 
constant maturities and the monetary base from Federal Reserve 
Statistical Releases H.15 (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
data.htm) and H.3 (www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/), 
respectively. 
6For early treatments, see, for example, Calvo and Guidotti (1990).
7See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service 
(2010), table FD-5.
8Missale and Blanchard (1994) analyze the relationship between 
the size of debt and its maturity structure in the case of Belgium, 
Ireland, and Italy, and show that the maturity structure varies inversely 
with the size of the debt/GDP ratio. They interpret this as evidence 
that a shorter maturity is needed to contain the temptation to inflate 
debt away when debt is larger.
9See Economist Newspaper Limited (2008).
10For example, the low interest rates of the last decade have some-
times been attributed to a “global saving glut;” see Bernanke (2005).
11It should be noted that hyperinflations exacerbate underlying fiscal 
imbalances; when inflation is so high that it impacts the real value 
of money on a day-to-day basis, even minor delays in the collection 
of taxes have a large effect on the real value of tax revenues.
12More precisely, Catão and Terrones (2005) use a logarithmic speci-
fication for one plus the inflation rate, and they find that a 1 percent 
increase in the deficit/GDP ratio is associated with 0.044 log points 
for their logarithmic measure. At low levels of inflation, this trans-
lates to 5 percent extra inflation, but this effect becomes bigger at 
higher inflation rates.
13To mention but one example, Barro and Gordon (1983) stress the 
time inconsistency problem that arises when the central bank wishes 
to push employment beyond its equilibrium level. Ireland (2000) 
views this as a cause for the inflation experienced by the United 
States in the 1970s.
14The 5th (10th) percentile is defined so that 5 percent (10 percent) 
of the points in the bin lie at or below it.
15International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department (1990, 1995, 
2000, 2009).
16It may seem more natural to treat inflation as the dependent vari-
able and the surplus as the independent variable. However, ours is 
a purely statistical exercise, trying to establish correlation patterns 
among two variables with no pretense of establishing causation. In 
this form, the regression allows us to concentrate on the low-surplus 
quantiles that we are most interested in. We have run similar regres-
sions inverting the dependent and independent variables, and our  
results are similar.
17The figure for gross financial liabilities would be even more striking, 
mainly because of the recent Japanese experience, where very large 
gross financial liabilities coexisted with stable or declining prices.
18Sometimes governments resort to forced lending; in this case, a 
proper economic accounting would require us to disentangle how 
much lenders would willingly offer the government from the hidden 
tax that is imposed by the mandatory government scheme. Fortunately, 
this is not an issue for the OECD countries in the period we consider.
19See, for example, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); 
Cukierman (1992); and Alesina and Summers (1993).
20In the case of Japan, the central bank only gained operational in-
dependence in 1997, well after the crisis had started, but still well 
before government debt grew to alarming levels. See, for example, 
Bernanke (2010).
21See Joumard et al. (2008).
22For more detailed accounts of the financial crisis in Finland and 
Sweden, see, for example, Honkapohja et al. (2009); Jonung, 
Schuknecht, and Tujula (2005); and Englund (1999).
23See Holden and Vikøren (1996). In later years, the basket corre-
sponded to the accounting unit of the European Community—the ECU.
24Unlike in figure 5, the actual occurrence of deficits without the 
correction for inflation is plotted in figure 6, panel C. The pattern is 
very similar even with the correction.
25Plotting net liabilities would show a similar pattern. However, both 
the Finnish and Swedish governments own substantial interests in 
private companies, whose market values fluctuated in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. These movements confound the underlying evolu-
tion of the debt/GDP ratio driven by growth and stable fiscal finances.
26It is interesting to note that the macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
evolution continued to be very similar in both Finland and Sweden, 
even though their respective institutional environments became very 
different from the mid-1990s onward. Finland opted to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EU), relin-
quishing its ability to run an independent monetary policy and ac-
cepting the fiscal constraints implied by the EU’s Stability and Growth 
Pact. Sweden remained outside of the eurozone, but pursued similar 
fiscal and monetary policies to those of Finland, even though it was 
not bound by external constraints.
27See Stone and Ziemba (1993).96 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
28As we already mentioned, the large outlier in 1998 is due to one-
off debt assumptions. The actual occurrence of deficits without the 
correction for inflation is plotted in figure 7, panel C. The pattern  
is very similar even with the correction.
29Additional growth would also have helped tax revenues, and would 
thus most likely have reduced the deficits. At the same time, the 
Japanese government paid very low real interest rates on its debt; 
had the economy grown faster, higher rates might have prevailed, 
increasing the burden of debt.
30Of course, the recent experience in Greece shows that market 
expectations can change abruptly.
31We are indebted to R. Anton Braun for suggesting this observation.
32In fact, many economists have complained that the Bank of Japan 
was too restrictive given the economic conditions; see, for example, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999).97 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIx: DATA
Two separate samples were created for our analysis. 
We present further details on our primary sample com-
prising data from most countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and our larger 
sample composed of data on 52 countries in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. 
OECD sample
The primary sample for our article was compiled using 
the OECD Economic Outlook Database on SourceOECD 
(www.sourceoecd.org). While this sample does not include 
all OECD countries, for exposition purposes it will be 
labeled as such. We gathered annual statistics of general 
government net lending, net and gross general government 
financial liabilities, and the inflation as measured by the 
CPI for 23 countries over the period 1970–2008. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Slovak 
Republic, and Turkey were not included because of data 
availability issues with the particular series of interest. 
For an exhaustive list of the data availability of the net 
lending statistic, as well as the countries used, see table A1. 
In the OECD Economic Outlook Database, the general 
government sector consolidates accounts of the central, 
state, and local governments, plus social security. Addi-
tionally, net lending, net financial liabilities, and gross 
financial liabilities are all scaled as a percentage of GDP. 
In the OECD Economic Outlook Database, govern-
ment net lending is defined as general government current 
tax and nontax receipts less general government total out-
lays.1 Tax receipts of the government sector include the 
sum of direct taxes on household and business sectors, 
indirect taxes, and social security contributions. Nontax 
receipts pertain to operating surpluses, property income, 
user charges and fees, and other current account and capital 
transfers received by the general government. Total out-
lays consist of current outlays plus capital outlays. Cur-
rent outlays are the sum of current consumption, transfer 
payments, subsidies, and property income paid (includ-
ing interest payments).2 
Gross financial liabilities refer to all the debt and other 
liabilities (short- and long-term) of all the institutions in 
the general government sector. Subsequently, net financial 
liabilities measure these gross financial liabilities of the 
government sector less the financial assets. Such assets 
may be cash, bank deposits, loans to the private sector, 
participation in private sector companies, holdings in pub-
lic corporations, or foreign exchange reserves, depending 
on the institutional structure of the country concerned and 
data availability.3 The status and treatment of government 
liabilities with respect to their employee pension plans 
in the national accounts vary across countries, making 
international comparability of government debts difficult. 
The current interpretation of the 1993 System of National 
Accounts distinguishing between “autonomous” funded 
pension plans and “nonautonomous” pension plans is 
maintained for this sample.4 
IMF sample
The second sample was created by collecting the 
government deficit, the inflation as measured by the CPI, 
and the GDP of each country from the country pages of 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics Yearbooks.5 This sample will be referred to as 
the IMF sample. Annual figures were recorded over the 
period 1970–2008 for 52 countries. For some countries 
the only reported government budget was that of the 
central government; however, the general government 
budget was used for every country in which it was avail-
able over the entire history. For an exhaustive list of the 
data availability of the deficit statistic, as well as the coun-
tries used, see table A1. The deficit calculated by the IMF 
in its International Financial Statistics is the difference 
between revenue, including grants received, and the sum 
of expenditures and lending minus repayments.6 Subse-
quently, this deficit calculation is also equal, with the oppo-
site sign, to the sum of the net borrowing by the government 
plus the net decrease in government cash, deposits, and 
securities held for liquidity purposes, and parallels the 
OECD net lending statistic accordingly. 
Table A1 summarizes the two samples by listing the 
particular countries used in each; the data availability of 
the particular deficit/surplus statistic; and the particular 
aggregation of the government budget reported in the 
IMF sample. 
1Sources and Methods of the OECD Economic Outlook, annex table 27, 
available at www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_2649_34573_ 
1847822_1_1_1_1,00.html (with general information available at  
www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods).
2Ibid., annex tables 25 and 36.
3Ibid., annex table 33.
4Ibid.
5To construct the full time series for each country, we used International 
Monetary Fund, Statistics Department (1990, 1995, 2000, 2009).
6See International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department (2009), p. xxvi.98 3Q/2010, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIx: DATA (CONTINUED)
    TaBlE a1
Countries included in the analysis
       Government
Country   OECD   IMF  unit  
     
Argentina     1970–2004   Central  
Australia   1970–2008   1970–2002, 2004–08   Central  
Austria   1970–2008   1970–97, 2006–08   General  
Belgium   1970–2008   1970–2008   Central  
Brazil     1970–94, 1997–98, 2006–08   Central  
Burkina Faso     1973–2005   Central  
Cameroon     1975–83, 1989–95, 1998–99   Central  
Canada   1970–2008   1970–2007   Central  
Chile     1970–2008   Central  
Colombia     1970–2006   Central  
Costa Rica     1970–2006   Central  
Cyprus     1970–2003   Central  
Denmark   1971–2008   1970–2000, 2006–08   General  
Egypt     1975–79, 1981–2004, 2006–07   General  
Finland   1970–2008   1970–2008   Central  
France   1978–2008   1970–97, 1999–2007   General  
Germany   1970–2008   1970–2008   General  
Ghana     1970–97   Central  
Greece   1970–2008   1970–2007   General  
Iceland   1980–2008   1972–2008   General  
India     1970–2008   Central  
Indonesia     1970–2008   Central  
Iran     1972–2007   Central  
Ireland   1970–2008   1970–2002, 2006–08   General  
Israel     1970–2001, 2006–08   Central  
Italy   1970–2008   1970–2008   Central  
Japan   1970–2008   1970–93, 2001–06   General  
Kenya     1970–2006   Central  
Malaysia     1970–99   Central  
Mexico     1972–2008   Central  
Morocco     1970–2005, 2007–08   Central  
Netherlands   1970–2008   1970–2007   Central  
New Zealand   1986–2008   1970–88, 1990–2005   Central  
Nigeria     1970–74, 1976–94, 1997–2007   Central  
Norway   1970–2008   1970–2007   General  
Pakistan     1970–2007   Central  
Paraguay     1970–2007   Central  
Peru     1970–2007   Central  
Philippines     1970–2005, 2008   Central  
Portugal   1977–2008   1970–98, 2006–08   General  
South Africa     1970–2008   Central  
South Korea   1975–2008   1970–99, 2001–07   Central  
Spain   1970–2008   1970–2007   Central  
Sweden   1970–2008   1970–2000, 2002–07   Central  
Switzerland   1990–2008   1970–2007   Central  
Tanzania     1970–2005   Central  
Thailand     1970–2003   Central  
Tunisia     1972–2007   Central  
Turkey     1970–81, 1983–84, 1987–96   Central  
United Kingdom   1970–2008   1970–2008   General  
United States   1970–2008   1970–2008   Central  
Uruguay     1970–2007   Central  
Notes: The years in the second and third columns indicate the periods for which data are available. The second column indicates the data availability 
of countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) sample, and the third column indicates the data availability 
of countries in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sample. Government unit, in the fourth column, refers only to the particular aggregation of 
government budget reported in the IMF sample (all data in the OECD sample are reported for the general government).
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department (1990, 1995, 2000, 2009); and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
SourceOECD and the Sources and Methods of the OECD Economic Outlook, available at www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods.99 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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